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The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials
in Will Contests
Josef Athanast
Hazel Mann, a resident of Mill Valley, California, died at the
age of 94 on March 22, 1981.' In a will executed in July 1976, she
left the bulk of her estate to one of her two nephews, Roy Laird
Smith.2 Her other nephew, Norman Van Gorp, contested the will.8
The jury heard testimony that Smith had been appointed
Mann's conservator in November 1975 because she was "not eating
or caring for herself properly; ... [she] was unclean and smelled of
urine;.., her home was unkempt and her bed filthy;.., and [she]
seemed 'kind of dreamy.' ", Mann's doctor testified at the conser-
vatorship proceeding that "[Mann] would sometimes appear ex-
tremely senile, sometimes better and more oriented."5 The jury
also heard testimony that Mann's "mental condition 'considerably
improved' after [Smith] became her conservator."' Further testi-
mony indicated that, in July 1976, Smith brought Mann to a friend
of his, an attorney, so she could execute a will.7 All of the witnesses
to the signing of the will, including Mann's doctor, "testified
[Mann] was alert and knew she was signing a will."8 Finally, "[a]
good deal of emphasis at trial was placed on [Smith's] purchase
with conservatorship funds of a $4,000 hot tub which was used pri-
marily by [him] and his friends."9
t B.S. 1988, Indiana University; J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Chicago.
Estate of Mann, 184 Cal App 3d 593, 229 Cal Rptr 225, 227 (1986).
Id at 228.
3 See id.
' Id at 227.
o Id at 228.
O Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
' Id.
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The jury set aside Mann's will on the grounds of testamentary
incapacity10 and undue influence. 1 The California Court of Ap-
peals reversed because the jury's verdict was inconsistent with Cal-
ifornia's laws of testamentary incapacity and undue influence.' 2
Since Mann knew she was signing a will, she was considered com-
petent under California law."5 Moreover, said the reviewing court,
because no evidence existed that Smith used, undue influence to
affect the dispositive contents of the will, 4 the jury's finding of
undue influence was mere speculation.'5 The jury ignored the con-
trolling legal definitions of testamentary incapacity and undue in-
fluence and apparently based their verdict on the evidence regard-
ing Mann's inability to care for herself and on Smith's purchase of
the hot tub. 6
After reversing the verdict, the Court of Appeals complained
that a 'legion' of appellate decisions have been necessary" to re-
verse juries who invalidate wills based on nothing more than "their
own concepts of how testators should have disposed of their
properties." 7
This Comment argues that no form of jury trial should be per-
mitted in will contests, and advances four reasons for this conclu-
sion. First, jury trials are more time consuming than bench trials.
For example, Mann took more than five years to resolve.' 8 Second,
jury trials are less "legally fair" than bench trials because juries are
more likely to reach a verdict contrary to the law. For example, the
Mann jury ignored clear evidence of competency and found undue
influence without any supporting evidence. Third, lay juries often
base their verdicts on the wrong evidence. For example, the jury
10 Id at 229. Testamentary capacity is the mental ability that is recognized in law as
sufficient to make a will. It is determined by examining whether the testator "has sufficient
mental capacity to be able to understand the nature of the act he is doing." Estate of
Smith, 200 Cal 152, 252 P 325, 328 (1926). See also In re McCafferty's Will, 142 Misc 371,
254 NYS 789, 798 (Sur Ct), aff'd, 236 AD 678, 257 NYS 978 (1932).
" Estate of Mann, 229 Cal Rptr at 231. Undue influence is "influence used directly to
procure the will ... amount[ing] to coercion destroying free agency on the part of the testa-
tor." Estate of Welch, 43 Cal 2d 173, 272 P2d 512, 514 (1954) (emphasis in original). See
also In re Chinsky's Will, 150 Misc 274, 268 NYS 719, 721 (Sur Ct 1934).
2 See Estate of Mann, 229 Cal Rptr at 238.
" See id at 229-30.
" See id at 233.
" Id.
See id at 227-28.
17 Id at 234 (quoting Estate of Fritschi, 60 Cal 2d 367, 384 P2d 656, 659 (1963)).
"I Mann died in 1981, and the will contest was not over until the 1986 Court of Appeals
decision. Had a judge decided this contest it the trial level, it might have been resolved
years earlier.
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apparently found Mann incompetent because she was unable to
care for herself. This finding ignored clear evidence that she was
mentally fit when she signed the will. Finally, juries are vulnerable
to the emotional overlays that pervade will contests; they often
base verdicts on their impressions of the contestant and the devi-
see, rather than on the testator's will. The Mann jury apparently
based its finding of undue influence on nothing more than a per-
ception that Smith had taken advantage of his position as Mann's
conservator by spending her money on luxuries for himself and his
friends.
Balancing these arguments against the use of juries in will
contests are two arguments supporting the use of at least some
form of jury trial in will contests. First, one could argue that jury
trials are more equitable than bench trials because jurors decide
cases using their common sense ideas of fairness and justice, rather
than rigidly applying the law. The Mann jury may have felt that
Smith did not deserve the bounty of Mann's estate since he had
taken advantage of his position as her conservator, and thus they
may have invalidated the will to prevent Smith from obtaining
Mann's property. Second, one could argue that jury trials of will
contests add legitimacy to the legal system by fostering community
participation in the resolution of legal disputes. This Comment ar-
gues that neither of these arguments is persuasive.
Part I of this Comment presents a brief history of will con-
tests. Part II addresses the constitutional right to jury trial in will
contests. Part III addresses the common law right to jury trial in
will contests. Part IV examines the various statutory rights to jury
trial in will contests. Finally, part V weighs the advantages and
disadvantages of jury trials in will contests and discusses whether a
right to jury trial, no right to jury trial or a middle position, such
as an advisory jury or a jury that could render only a special ver-
dict, would be the best regime. The Comment concludes that states
should have a bright-line rule forbidding jury trials in will contests.
I. THE HISTORY OF WILL CONTESTS
One of the earliest records of jurisdiction over will contests is
found in Glanvill's treatise, The Laws and Customs of England,
written sometime between 1187 and 1189.19 Glanvill stated that
"anyone who ha[d] ... anything to say" against a will "ought to be
" Ranulf de Glanvill, The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England
(G.D.G. Hall, ed) (Nelson, 1965).
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heard ... in an ecclesiastical court."20 The ecclesiastical courts ad-
ministered canon law, which recognized the Pope as supreme au-
thority, not common law, which recognized the King.21
Not every English will was contested in the ecclesiastical
courts, however. A distinction was made between wills devising
only personalty', wills devising only realty and wills devising both
personalty and realty. Wills devising only personalty were con-
tested in the ecclesiastical courts,2 which sat without a jury.23
Wills devising only realty fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the common law courts, 4 which had jury trials. These wills were
not probated 25 in the common law courts, but were operative im-
mediately.26 The devisee received title to the realty immediately
upon the death of the testator, "just as title passes to the grantee
in a deed immediately upon its delivery. '' 27 When heirs or devisees
wanted to challenge the validity of devises of realty, they brought a
common law action, such as ejectment or trespass, to try title.23
Finally, with respect to wills devising both personalty and realty,
the ecclesiastical courts had to choose whether or not to admit a
will to probate, but this decision "did not determine whether the
will was a valid devise of real estate."2 9 The provision of the will
devising real estate was operative immediately upon the death of
the testator, and a contestant of that provision had to bring an
action to try title in front of a jury in a common law court. Thus,
devises of personalty were contested in front of judges in ecclesias-
tical courts, while devises of realty were contested in front of juries
in common law courts.
After the Reformation, Chancery courts, which, like ecclesias-
tical courts, sat without a jury, shared with the ecclesiastical courts
2 Id at 81.
21 See Thomas E. Atkinson, Brief History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 Mo
L Rev 107, 115 (1943).
22 See Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in
England and America § 1887 at 485 (Little, Brown & Co., 14th ed 1918).
23 See Lewis M. Simes, The Function of Will Contests, 44 Mich L Rev 503, 556 (1946).
24 See Lewis M. Simes and Paul E. Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in
America, 42 Mich L Rev 965, 971 (1944).
2 Historically, probate was a court procedure where the executor offered proof as to
the validity of a will to an ecclesiastical judge, who would pass on the proof. Today, this
term includes all matters regarding the administration of estates. See, for example, In re
Estate of Hirsh, 27 Ill App 2d 228, 169 NE2d 591, 594 (1960).
"6 See Simes & Basye, 42 Mich L Rev at 971.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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jurisdiction over many probate matters."0 Unlike ecclesiastical
courts, which administered canon law, the Chancery courts admin-
istered equitable relief. This concurrent jurisdiction was the begin-
ning of the decay of ecclesiastical probate jurisdiction.3 '
Despite Chancery's encroachment upon ecclesiastical probate
jurisdiction, proceedings to contest the validity of a will devising
realty continued to be tried before a jury in common law courts,
with one notable exception: Chancery courts sometimes enter-
tained suits in equity that could not be resolved without a determi-
nation of a will's validity.32 In cases of this sort, the Chancery
court sent that issue to a common law court, where it was tried
before a jury.3 Chancery judges did not consider themselves bound
by a jury verdict; if they deemed the verdict unsatisfactory, they
would order a new trial.34 Thus, while contests of devises of realty
continued to be tried in common law courts before a jury, Chan-
cery judges, as a practical matter, could have the final word by
ordering new trials until a satisfactory verdict was reached.
At the time American colonial courts were established, juris-
diction in England over will contests was divided among three sets
of courts: ecclesiastical, common law and Chancery.35 This tripar-
tite system influenced the colonies when they separated from Eng-
land and began to establish their own court system.3 6 Gradually,
many American colonies began to establish single courts having the
combined powers of the English ecclesiastical, common law and
Chancery courts. 7 For example, South Carolina gave county and
precinct courts full power to determine all disputes concerning
wills and to administer estates, including both wills of personalty
and wills of realty.38 As a result of these early attempts to combine
the jurisdiction over will contests in one court, wills of realty gen-
erally came to be probated in the United States just as wills of
personalty."9
30 Id at 972-74.
1 Atkinson, 8 Mo L Rev at 117 (cited in note 21). For a more thorough discussion of
the reasons for the decay of ecclesiastical probate jurisdiction, see id at 117-20.
" See Story, 3 Equity Jurisprudence § 1889 at 486-90 (cited in note 22).
33 Id.
" Id at 487.
" Atkinson, 8 Mo L Rev at 122.
36 See Simes & Basye, 42 Mich L Rev at 977-78 (cited in note 24).
s Id at 978-82.
Id at 981 (citing David J. McCord, ed, 7 Statutes at Large of South Carolina 172
(Act of 1721) (1840)).
9 Simes, 44 Mich L Rev at 556 (cited in note 23).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
IN WILL CONTESTS
In the United States today there is no constitutional right to
jury trial in will contest proceedings. Will contests are tried in
state courts, 40 and the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which guarantees the right to jury trial in certain
civil cases, has not been extended to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause.4 Consequently, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that "trial by jury may be modified by
a state or abolished altogether. '42
Even though almost all state constitutions contain a provision
similar to the Seventh Amendment,43 state courts have held that
no state constitutional right to a jury trial of will contests exists. 44
40 There is a judicially created exception to subject matter jurisdiction "which places
matters of probate and estate administration outside the power of the federal courts." Rice
v Rice Foundation, 610 F2d 471, 474 (7th Cir 1979) (citing Markham v Allen, 326 US 490,
494 (1946)). Thus, federal courts "do not ordinarily have jurisdiction to set aside a will or
the probate thereof." Moore v Graybeal, 843 F2d 706, 709 (3rd Cir 1988) (citing Sutton v
English, 246 US 199, 205 (1918)). For an analysis of the probate exception to federal subject
matter jurisdiction, see Dragan v Miller, 679 F2d 712 (7th Cir 1982).
" See Fay v New York, 332 US 261, 288 (1947).
42 Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 324 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v
Maryland, 395 US 784 (1969). See also Walker v Sauvinet, 92 US 90, 92-93 (1875) (the
Seventh Amendment "relates only to trials in the courts of the United States." Moreover,
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "does not necessarily imply that all
trials in the State courts ... must be by jury."); New York Central RR Co. v White, 243 US
188, 208 (1917) ("The denial of a trial by jury is not inconsistent with due process."); Wag-
ner Electric Manufacturing Co. v Lyndon, 262 US 226, 232 (1923) ("[Tlhe deprivation of a
right of trial by jury in a state court does not deny the parties due process of law under the
Federal Constitution.").
"8 Ala Const, Art I, § 11; Alaska Const, Art I, § 16; Ariz Const, Art II, § 23; Ark Const,
Art II, § 7; Cal Const, Art I, § 16; Conn Const, Art I, § 19; Del Const, Art I, § 4; Fla Const,
Art I, § 22; Ga Const, Art I, § 1, 11; Hawaii Const, Art I, § 13; Idaho Const, Art 1, § 7; Ill
Const, Art I, § 13; Ind Const, Art I, § 20; Iowa Const, Art I, § 9; Kan Const, Bill of Rights,
§ 5; Ky Const, Bill of Rights, § 7; Me Const, Art I, § 20; Md Const, Declaration of Rights,
Art 23; Mass Const, Pt 1, Art 16; Mich Const, Art I, § 14; Minn Const, Art I, § 4; Miss
Const, Art 3, § 31; Mo Const, Art I, § 22(a); Mont Const, Art II, § 26; Neb Const, Art I, § 6;
Nev Const, Art I, § 3; NH Const, Pt 1, Art 20; NJ Const, Art I, 9; NM Const, Art II, § 12;
NY Const, Art I, § 2; NC Const, Art I, § 25; ND Const, Art I, § 13; Ohio Const, Art I, § 5;
Okla Const, Art II, § 19; Or Const, Art I, § 17; Pa Const, Art I, § 6; RI Const, Art I, § 15; SC
Const, Art I, § 14; SD Const, Art VI, § 6; Tenn Const, Art I, § 6; Tex Const, Art I, § 15;
Utah Const, Art I, § 10; Vt Const, Ch I, Art 12; Va Const, Art I, § 11; Wash Const, Art I,
§ 21; W Va Const, Art III, § 13; Wis Const, Art I, § 5.
" See In re Roarke's Estate, 8 Ariz 16, 68 P 527, 529 (1902); In re Land's Estate, 166
Cal 538, 137 P 246, 247 (1914) ("[Tlhe right to a trial by jury secured by the Constitution
has no reference to or bearing upon proceedings in probate. . . ."); In re Estate of Etchart,
179 Colo 142, 500 P2d 363, 364 (1972); Appealof Slattery, 90 Conn 48, 96 A 178, 179 (1915);
Cummins v Cummins, 15 Del 423, 31 A 816, 818-19 (1895); Lavey v Doig, 25 Fla.611, 6 S
259, 261 (1889); Rudd v Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 666 P2d 639, 643 (1983) ("[T]he right to trial
[1990:
WILL CONTESTS
This is apparently so only because there was no inherent right to a
jury trial in will contests in the English ecclesiastical courts.4 The
Illinois state constitution, for example, provides that "[t]he right
of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate." 6
Construing this, the Illinois Supreme Court held that there was no
constitutional right to jury trial in will contest proceedings because
the English ecclesiastical courts and early American probate courts
sat without juries when hearing will contests.47 Thus, states such as
Illinois rest the proposition that there is no state constitutional
right to jury trial in will contests on the antiquarian procedure of
the ecclesiastical courts.
Such a rationale is flawed. The decision of whether to have
jury trials of will contests should not be based solely on the histori-
cal practices of the ecclesiastical courts of England, because these
courts did not decide all will contests. Although the validity of a
devise of personalty was tested without a jury in the ecclesiastical
courts, the validity of a devise of realty was tested before a jury in
the common law courts.4 Illinois, like all other states, has col-
lapsed devises of personalty and devises of realty into one action.
The Illinois Supreme Court could just as easily have found a his-
torical justification for the opposite conclusion, namely that be-
cause contests of devises of real property were tried before a jury
in English common law courts, there is a state constitutional right
to jury trial in all will contests. Thus, a principled determination of
whether there should be a right to jury trial of will contests must
rest on some basis other than history.
by jury exist[s] only in cases at common law, not in cases triable in a court of equity.");
Moody v Found, 208 Ill 78, 69 NE 831 (1904); In re Estate of Suesz, 228 Kan 275, 613 P2d
947, 949-50 (1980); Cyr v Cote, 396 A2d 1013, 1017 (Me 1979), citing In re Estate of How-
ard, 58 Cal App 3d 250, 129 Cal Rptr 836 (1976) ("[Tlhe right to a jury trial in a will contest
is not one of constitutional dimension .... ); In re Estate of Prigge, 352 NW2d 443, 446
(Minn Ct App 1984); Campbell v Saint Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo 200, 139 SW2d 935,
939 (1940); Wainwright v Bartlett, 51 Nev 170, 271 P 689, 690 (1928); Petition of Atkins,
126 NH 577, 493 A2d 1203, 1204 (1985) (The right to a jury trial in "probate matters ... is
not constitutionally guaranteed, nor did it exist at common law."); In re Morrissey's Will,
91 NJ Eq 289, 107 A 70, 72 (NJ 1919); Kear v Court of Common Pleas, 67 Ohio St 2d 189,
423 NE2d 427, 429 (1981); Rantru v Unger, 73 Or App 680, 700 P2d 272, 273-74 (1985); In
re Fleming's Estate, 265 Pa 399, 109 A 265, 268 (1919); Shaw v Shaw, 28 SD 221, 133 NW
292, 293 (1911); Jones v Sands, 41 Tenn App 1, 292 SW2d 492, 497 (1953) ("[Tlhe right of
jury trial in will contests is purely statutory."); In re Welch's Will, 69 Vt 127, 37 A 250, 252
(1896); In re Weidman's Will, 189 Wis 318, 207 NW 950, 951 (1926).
" See William J. Bowe and Douglas H. Parker, 3 Page on the Law of Wills § 26.85
(W.H. Anderson, 1961).
46 Ill Const, Art I, § 13.
4 See Moody v Found, 208 Ill 78, 69 NE 831 (1904).
," See text accompanying notes 22-29.
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III. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
IN WILL CONTESTS
While most states have decided that there is no constitutional
right to jury trial in will contests, two states, Indiana and North
Carolina, have found such a right at common law.4" The Indiana
Supreme Court's reasoning for granting a common law right to jury
trial of will contests seems to be based on an Indiana rule of trial
procedure providing that causes of action tried by a jury prior to
June 18, 1852,50 shall continue to be tried by a jury." Prior to that
date, an Indiana statute expressly provided for jury trial in will
contests.52 Although this statute no longer exists, the Indiana Su-
preme Court held nonetheless that there is a right to jury trial in
will contests.5 3 Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court apparently has
created a common law right to jury trial of will contests, rigidly
preserving the right to jury trial exactly as it was on June 18, 1852.
The Indiana Supreme Court's reasoning, therefore, is subject
to the same criticism as that of state courts that do not recognize a
constitutional right to jury trial in will contests. The Indiana Su-
preme Court gives no rationale for preserving the right to jury trial
as it was in 1852. 5" It looks only to a statute no longer on the books
to determine whether there should be a right to jury trial.
North Carolina common law makes a jury trial mandatory in
will contest proceedings.55 Jury trial may not be waived because
the state considers all will contests in rem proceed-
ings56"-proceedings to decide the right in the testator's property
against all the world. 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court held
that since the contestant and the devisee are not actually parties to
the proceeding, they cannot by consent relieve the judge of his
duty to submit the issue to a jury.58 Although this argument ex-
" See Crawfordsville Trust Co. v Ramsey, 178 Ind 258, 98 NE 177, 183 (1912); In re
Morrow's Will, 234 NC 365, 67 SE2d 279, 281 (1951).
"0 This is about the time of the adoption of the Indiana state constitution, which be-
came effective November 1, 1851. See Ind Const.
" See Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 38(A), reprinted in Ind Code Ann § 34 (West
1987).
" See Crawfordsville Trust Co., 98 NE at 183.
53 Id.
11 See id.
" In re Morrow's Will, 67 SE2d at 281.
5 Id.
67 An in rem proceeding is one taken directly against property, without reference to the
title of individual claimants. See Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714, 734 (1877), overruled, Shaffer
v Heitner, 433 US 186 (1977).
I" See In re Roediger's Will, 209 NC 470, 184 SE 74, 77-78 (NC 1936).
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plains why a jury trial cannot be waived by the parties in North
Carolina, it does not explain why there must be a jury trial as op-
posed to a bench trial in the first place. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court merely stated that will contests "must be determined
by a jury's verdict"; it gave no reasoning for this determination."9
Contrary to the common law in Indiana and North Carolina,
in the nine other states where no statute addresses whether there
is a right to jury trial in will contests, 60 common law dictates that
there is no such right.6 ' These states base their claims on the same
unconvincing historical argument advanced by states that find no
constitutional right to jury trial in will contests.2 It is noteworthy
that in three of these states-Delaware, Ohio and Wisconsin-the
will contest judge, at his or her discretion, may convene a jury.6
Thus, despite the common law traditions of these three states de-
nying an absolute jury right, they remain reluctant to abandon
completely the use of juries in will contest proceedings.
IV. THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
IN WILL CONTESTS
The majority of states have statutes controlling whether there
is a right to jury trial in will contests. These statutes range from
granting a waivable right to jury trial to denying jury trial alto-
gether. In Georgia, for example, the statute provides:
A party to a civil case in the probate court shall have the
right to a jury trial if such right is asserted by a written
demand for jury trial with the first pleading of the party.
If a party fails to assert the right to a jury trial, the right
In re Morrow's Will, 67 SE2d at 281.
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Ohio, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont
and Wisconsin.
" See Appeal of Slattery, 90 Conn 48, 96 A 178, 179 (1915); Cummins v Cummins, 15
Del 423, 31 A 816, 818-19 (1895); Lavey v Doig, 25 Fla 611, 6 So 259, 261 (1889); Rudd v
Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 666 P2d 639, 643 (1983); In re Morrissey's Will, 9.1 NJ Eq 289, 107 A
70, 72 (NJ 1919); Kear v Court of Common Pleas, 67 Ohio St 2d 189, 423 NE2d 427, 429
(1981); Briggs Drive, Inc. v Moorehead, 103 RI 555, 239 A2d 186, 187 (1968) (Although a tax
suit, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that if a right to jury trial in an action exists,
"its origins must be found either in the constitution or in some legislative enactment."); In
re Welch's Will, 69 Vt 127, 37 A 250, 252 (1896); In re Weidman's Will, 189 Wis 318, 207
NW 950, 951 (1926).
2 See section II.
"' Cummins v Cummins, 31 A at 818-19; Kear v Court of Common Pleas, 423 NE2d at
429. In Delaware and Wisconsin, the jury, if called, may render only an advisory verdict. In
re Ainscow's Purported Will, 41 Del 148, 17 A2d 227, 228 (Del Super Ct 1940); In re Weid-
man's Will, 207 NW at 951.
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shall be deemed waived and may not thereafter be
asserted."
Fourteen other states have statutes of this type.6 5
Two states, Montana and Nevada, have statutes granting a
right to jury trial in will contests when requested by one of the
parties, but requiring that the jury return a special verdict.6 The
Montana statutes provide that "[w]hen a jury is demanded, the
district court must impanel a jury to try the case. 6e7 Then, after
hearing the case, the jury "must return a special verdict upon the
issues submitted to it by the court, upon which the judgment of
the court must be rendered, either admitting the will to probate or
rejecting it.'"6 Likewise, the Nevada statutes allow any party to
64 Ga Code Ann § 15-9-121(a) (Michie Supp 1989).
6' See Ala Code § 43-8-190 (1982) (The contest of a will "must, on application of either
party, be tried by a jury."); Ill Ann Stat ch 110 1/2, §§ 8-1(c), 8-2(c) (1987) ("Any party to [a
will contest] proceeding may demand a trial by jury."); Iowa Code § 633.311 (Supp 1989)
("An action objecting to the probate of a proffered will, or to set aside a will, is triable in the
probate court as an action at law, and the Rules of Civil Procedure governing law actions,
including demand for jury trial, shall be applicable thereto."); Md Estates & Trusts Code
Ann § 2-105(b) (1974) ("At the request of an interested person ... the issue of fact may be
determined by a court of law."); Mich Comp Laws § 600.857 (1979) (Parties to proceedings
in probate court to contest the validity of a will have the right to demand a jury to deter-
mine issues of fact.); Miss Code § 91-7-19 (1972) ("At the request of either party to [a will
contest], an issue shall be made up and tried by a jury as to whether or not the writing
propounded be the will of the alleged testator."); Mo Ann Stat § 473.083(7) (Vernon Supp
1989) (In will contests, "[t]he issues shall be tried by a jury, or if no party requires a jury, by
the court, and the judgment thereon shall determine the issues. The verdict of jury or the
finding and judgment of the court is final .... ); Neb Rev Stat § 30-2429.01(4) (1985) (In
cases to contest wills, "[tlrial shall be to a jury unless a jury is waived by all parties who
have filed pleadings in the matter."); ND Cent Code § 30.1-15-04 (Supp 1989) ("In a con-
tested formal testacy proceeding, any party is entitled to jury trial of all issues of fact by
serving upon all appropriate parties and filing with the court a written demand for jury
trial."); Tenn Code Ann § 32-4-107(a) (1984) (The issue of the validity of a will "shall be
tried by a jury, and their verdict, and the judgment of the court upon the validity of the will
shall be certified to the court having probate jurisdiction over such will .... "); Tex Probate
Code Ann § 21 (Vernon 1980) ("In all contested probate ... proceedings in the district court
or in the county court or statutory probate court, county court at law or other statutory
court exercising probate jurisdiction, the parties shall be entitled to trial by jury as in other
civil actions."); Va Code § 64.1-88 (1987) ("A person interested ... may proceed by bill in
equity to impeach or establish the will, on which bill a trial by jury shall be ordered . . .");
W Va Code § 41-5-8 (1982) ("The circuit court shall order a trial by jury, if demanded by
any person interested, to ascertain whether the will in question .. .is the true will of the
decedent .... ); Wyo Stat § 2-2-309 (1980) ("If, on written demand, a jury is called for by
either party in [cases to contest wills] one shall be had as in other civil cases.").
" A special verdict is a compilation of responses returned by a jury to a series of spe-
cific factual questions submitted to them by the court. See, for example, Quaker City Gear
Works, Inc. v Skil Corp., 747 F2d 1446, 1453 (Fed Cir 1984). See also FRCP 49(a).
67 Mont Code Ann § 72-12-201 (1989).
8 Mont Code Ann § 72-12-202 (1989)1
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demand a jury on any questions affecting the validity of the will.6 9
If a jury is demanded, "[t]he jury must return a special verdict
upon the issues submitted to them by the court; and upon the ver-
dict ... the court must render judgment" as to the validity of the
will.70
In Alaska, Arizona, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, jury trial in will contests is at the
discretion of the judge. In Alaska, Arizona and Minnesota, the
court, in its discretion, may convene an advisory jury to decide any
issue of fact in cases where there is no constitutional right to jury
trial.7' Because there is no constitutional right to jury trial of will
contests in these states,72 advisory juries may be convened. Simi-
larly, Kentucky does not grant a right to jury trial of probate pro-
ceedings73 but the court, upon a motion by one of the parties or on
its own initiative, may try an issue with an advisory jury.74 In
Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, although there is no statutorily-
mandated right to jury trial,76 the judge, at his or her discretion,
may impanel an advisory jury.76 Finally, in Massachusetts, a pro-
bate court in any proceeding, upon demand by one of the parties,
may direct that any issues of fact shall be tried by a jury.77
Colorado, Hawaii, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina
and Utah dictate that jury trials may be requested by either party
or at the discretion of the judge. Colorado, Hawaii, New York,
South Carolina and Utah have statutes which grant parties the
right to a trial by jury in a will contest if they demand one, but
even if the parties waive their right to a jury trial, the court may
6 See Nev Rev Stat § 137.020(2) (1987).
70 Nev Rev Stat § 137.050 (1987).
7', See Alaska Stat § 13.06.085 (1989); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 14-1306 (West 1975); Minn
Stat Ann § 524.1-306 (West 1975).
7, See Alaska Const, Art I, § 16 ("[Rlight of trial by a jury ... is preserved [only] to the
same extent as it existed at common law."); In re Roarke's Estate, 8 Ariz 16, 68 P 527, 529
(1902); In re Hudson's Estate, 131 Minn 439, 155 NW 392, 393 (1915).
71 See Second National Bank & Trust Co. v First Security National Bank & Trust Co.,
398 SW2d 50, 53 (Ky 1965).
71 See Ky Rule of Civil Procedure 39.03 (Michie 1990).
78 See 58 Okla Stat Ann § 41 (West 1965); In re Estate of Holtz, 422 Pa 540, 222 A2d
885, 888 (1966).
7' See Hall v Williams, 204 Okla 308, 229 P.2d 584, 585 (1951); 20 Pa Cons Stat Ann
§ 777(c) (Purdon 1975).
77 See Mass Ann Laws ch 215, § 16 (Law Co-op 1986). This Massachusetts law allows
the probate court, at its discretion, to deny motions by will contestants for jury trials. See
Dimaggio v Verdone, 358 Mass 810, 265 NE2d 380 (1970).
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call an advisory jury. 8 Similarly, in New Mexico, "[i]f demanded,
in the manner provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is
entitled to a trial by jury in a formal testacy proceeding. '7 9 If this
right to trial by jury is not exercised, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals has held that the court may order a jury trial on its own
motion. 0
Although most states allow a jury trial in at least some will
contests, seven states8 have statutes that specifically deny jury tri-
als in will contests.82 Part V of this Comment argues that all states
should adopt similar statutes denying jury trials in will contests. In
some states providing a statutory right to jury trial in certain will
contest cases, the jury verdict is only advisory.8 3 Statutes which
allow for an advisory jury are of three types. The first type of stat-
ute allows parties to demand a jury trial, but the jury is merely
advisory. New Hampshire and Washington have this type of stat-
ute.8 The second type of statute allows a court to convene an advi-
sory jury at its discretion.85 The third type of statute allows parties
to demand a jury whose verdict will be binding, but if the parties
waive their demand, the court may call for an advisory jury. As
previously noted, Colorado, Hawaii, New York, South Carolina and
Utah have this type of statute.8
'" See 1987 Colo Rev Stat § 15-10-306; Hawaii Rev Stat § 560:1-306 (1985); NY SCPA
Law § 502 (McKinney 1967); SC Code Ann § 62-1-306 (Law Co-op Supp 1988); Utah Code
Ann § 75-1-306 (1978).
" NM Stat Ann § 45-1-306 (1989).
80 See In re Ferrill, 97 NM 383, 640 P2d 489, 495-96 (NM Ct App 1981).
8 Arkansas, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Oregon and South Dakota.
"' See Ark Stat Ann § 28-1-105(c) (1987); Cal Probate Code § 8252(b) (West Supp
1989); Kan Stat Ann § 59-2212 (1983); La Rev Stat Ann § 1732(3) (West Supp 1989); 18-A
Me Rev Stat Ann § 1-306 (1981); Or Rev Stat § 113.055(4) (1987); SD Cod Laws § 30-6-18
(1984).
83 An advisory verdict is a jury verdict that is not binding on the court. The judge may
accept or reject the jury's verdict. See, for example, FRCP 39(c).
8 See NH Rev Stat Ann § 567-A: 10 (Equity 1974 & 1988 Supp). See also NH Rev Stat
Ann § 567-A: 11 (Equity Supp 1988) ("The verdict or findings of the jury shall be advisory
and may be modified or set aside by the superior court if in its judgment such verdict or
findings are not a satisfactory basis upon which to found a probate court decree."); Wash
Rev Code Ann § 11.96.130 (West 1987); In re Matsas' Estate, 46 Wash 2d 266, 280 P2d 678,
679 (1955).
88 As previously noted, Alaska, Arizona, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma and Pennsyl- .
vania have this type of statute. See text accompanying notes 71-76.
88 See text accompanying note 78.
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V. THE PROS AND CONS OF JURY TRIALS
IN WILL CONTESTS
States vary widely in their use of jury trials in will contest pro-
ceedings. Most states have held that there is no constitutional
right to jury trial. Further, 13 states do not use juries at all when
deciding will contests. 7 Despite the fact that they are not constitu-
tionally required to do so, the remaining 37 states occasionally use
some form of jury when deciding will contests. This section dis-
cusses the four basic approaches to the use of jury trials in will
contests: (1) not using juries at all, (2) using advisory juries, (3)
using juries that may render only special verdicts, and (4) granting
a right to jury trials. After examining each of these approaches in
terms of the various arguments for and against jury trials, the
Comment concludes that the states should follow the first ap-
proach and not use juries when deciding will contests.
In order to decide whether juries should be used in will con-
test proceedings, one must examine non-historical arguments. One
cannot look to historical arguments. because, as discussed above,
the historical distinction between devises of personalty and devises
of realty enables one to justify either conclusion. The non-
historical arguments against the use of juries in will contest pro-
ceedings are: (1) jury trials are more time consuming, and thus
more costly to litigate, than bench trials; (2) jury trials are less
"legally fair" than bench trials; (3) jurors are inherently limited, as
laymen, in dealing with the issues that arise in will contests; and
(4) juries are vulnerable to the emotional overlays that pervade tri-
als of will contests. The arguments for the use of juries in will con-
test proceedings are: (1) jury trials are more "equitably fair" than
bench trials, and (2) juries add legitimacy to the legal system by
fostering community participation in the resolution of legal
disputes.
A. Arguments against Using Jury Trials in Will Contests
1. Jury Trials Are More Time Consuming, and Thus More
Costly, Than Bench Trials.
Only lawyers and contestants with unmeritorious claims bene-
fit from the delay inherent in will contest proceedings tried to a
" In Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont, the common
law dictates that there are no jury trials in will contests. In Arkansas, California, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Oregon and South Dakota, statutes dictate that there are no jury trials in
will contests.
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jury. The devisee and the contestant with a meritorious claim may
suffer severe economic consequences resulting from the unavoida-
ble delay inherent in jury trials.8 Parties to jury-tried will contests
characteristically accrue large legal fees, and may be forced to
postpone their enjoyment of the estate for several years.8 Courts
are also damaged by these will contests because the added delay
adds to court congestion."
It is difficult to determine how much additional time may be
required to try a case before a jury because "we cannot try the
same case by each method with a stopwatch in hand."9 Estimates
by experienced judges and lawyers as to the additional time re-
quired for jury trials vary widely.2 However, by proceeding on a
set of assumptions, Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard
Buchholz concluded that in the supreme court of New York
County, "on the average a bench trial would be 40 per cent less
time consuming than a jury trial of the same case." '93
Despite their finding, Zeisel, Kalven and Buchholz are propo-
nents of jury trials. They feel that a 40 percent time savings is not
sufficient to merit elimination of jury trials. Nonetheless, jury trials
of will contests should be eliminated because they may extend the
entire resolution process. The Zeisel-Kalven-Buchholz time esti-
mates do not consider the time that the appeal process requires,
and will contest jury verdicts have a relatively high percentage of
reversal on appeal.9 4 It follows that these jury verdicts will be ap-
pealed more often. Also, when a case is reversed, it may be re-
manded, further delaying the deserving party's enjoyment of the
decedent's estate. Thus, because of the extra time added by the
appeal, reversal and remand process, jury'trials of will contests are
more time consuming than the average jury trial.
Two empirical studies, although somewhat dated, illustrate
the high rate of reversal of will contests. In a California study of 96
will contests between 1892 and 1953 that were appealed for insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, 43 involved attacks on verdicts for the con-
See Recommendation Relating to Opening Estate Administration, 19 Cal L Revision
Commission Rep 787, 794 (1988); Gary D. Zweifel, Jury Trials Come to Probate Courts of
Georgia, 23 Ga St Bar J 96, 98 (Nov 1986).
" See Recommendation, 19 Cal L Revision Commission Rep at 794.
90 See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 Va L Rev 1055, 1058-59
(1964).
"' Id at 1059 (emphasis omitted).
92 Id.
93 Id.
"' Recommendation, 19 Cal L Revision Commission Rep at 793 (cited in note 88).
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testant; of these, 26 (62 percent) trial court verdicts were re-
versed. 5 Similarly, a Minnesota study of testamentary undue
influence cases and testamentary capacity cases found that juries
were reversed considerably more often than judges on appeal.9 6
The study involved 58 district court of appeals cases between 1880
and 1934 involving the issue of undue influence. 7 Seventeen of
these cases were tried by a jury.9 8 Jury verdicts were reversed in
ten of the 17, or approximately 60 percent, of the cases. 9 Judges,
in contrast, were reversed in only four of 41 undue influence cases,
a reversal rate of less than ten percent. 100 The Minnesota study
found similar results in an examination of 54 district court of ap-
peals cases between 1880 and 1934 involving the issue of testamen-
tary capacity."' Twenty of these cases were tried by a jury, but in
six of the 20 the jury was not allowed to decide the issue of testa-
mentary capacity. 10 2 The jury's verdict was reversed in four of the
remaining 14 cases (nearly 30 percent of the time).'0 3 In contrast,
judges were reversed in only four of 40, or ten percent, of testa-
mentary capacity cases. 104
Partially influenced by the California study, the California
Law Revision Commission recommended that California abandon
jury trials in will contests.'05 The Commission noted that the large
waste of time and resources involved when a will contest case goes
through the entire jury trial, appeal, and reversal process
postpones the enjoyment of the estate for several years.'06 This de-
lay provides unmeritorious contestants an opportunity to force
large compromise settlements to which they are not entitled. 107
Any delay experienced by the devisee or the meritorious con-
testant in receiving the benefits of the will may have severe eco-
nomic and personal consequences to his or her family.'08 Moreover,
increased delay leads to increased court congestion, forcing courts
" Comment, Will Contests on Trial, 6 Stan L Rev 91, 92 n 4 (1953).
" Edward S. Bade, Jury Trial in Will Cases in Minnesota, 22 Minn L Rev 513 (1938).
17 Id at 514.
98 Id.
" Id at 516.
10 Id at 517.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id at 518.
100 Id at 519.
100 Recommendation, 19 Cal L Revision Commission Rep at 793-94 (cited in note 88).
,o6 Id.
117 Id at 794.
1 See Zweifel, 23 Ga St Bar J at 98 (cited in note 88).
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to consider cases swiftly when they finally come to be heard." 9
Courts expedite cases to clear dockets rather than encourage juries
to deliberate intelligently and reach correct results.110 This may
lead to decreased public confidence in the court system."1
Problems resulting from the extra time jury trials of will con-
test cases take are not necessarily mitigated by states that stake
out a middle position, such as using advisory juries. Advisory jury
trials of will contests may be less time-consuming than regular jury
trials because advisory jury trials are not formally tried to the jury,
but to the judge.'1 2 The extra time required by a jury trial com-
pared to a bench trial is often due to "repeated bench conferences,
prolonged argument on evidentiary matters, and lengthy discus-
sions about proposed requests for instructions."' 3 Since advisory
jury trials are formally tried to the judge, these delaying factors are
largely absent."" Moreover, a judge's findings displace a jury's ad-
visory verdict on appeal," 5 and thus the argument that jury trials
of will contests are more time consuming because they are more
often reversed may not apply to advisory jury verdicts.
Similarly, jury trials of will contests by juries that render spe-
cial verdicts may be less time consuming than regular jury trials.
When a regular verdict is found to be error by an appellate court,
"the entire verdict collapses and all the issues in the case must be
relitigated." 6 In contrast, when a special verdict is found to be
error, it "may only affect a few of the jury's findings, thus limiting
a second trial to the issues covered by the tainted findings.""17 In
addition, because special verdicts provide a detailed rationale for
the jury's decision, trial on remand can sometimes be completely
avoided."'
I" See Task Force on the Administration of Justice, The President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 80 (1967).
This report describes the effects of the delay inherent in jury trials of criminal cases, not
will contest cases. However, the report's findings may by analogy be applied to will contest
cases.
110 Id.
" Id.
12 See Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 Harv L Rev 1363, 1364
(1987).
"I Id at 1369 (quoting Peter W. Culley, In Defense of Civil Juries, 35 Me L Rev 17, 26
(1983)).
Note, 100 Harv L Rev at 1369.
"5 See id at 1364.
11 Note, Resolving Inconsistencies in Federal Special Verdicts, 53 Fordham L Rev
1089, 1091 (1985).
117 Id.
'" Id.
[1990:
WILL CONTESTS
Although trials by advisory juries and juries that render spe-
cial verdicts may be less time consuming than regular jury trials,
these juries still must be impanelled and take time to deliberate.
All forms of jury trials in will contest cases are more time consum-
ing than bench trials, and cost probate litigants and the court time
and money. Therefore, the use of juries in probate proceedings
should be completely eliminated.
2. Jury Trials Are Less "Legally Fair" Than-Bench Trials.
Jury verdicts in will contests are reversed on appeal more
often than are judicial decisions, as the Minnesota study described
above indicates.11 9 While appellate decisions may not always be the
true measure of the absolute equities of lower court decisions, one
must remember that the lower court's duty is to render a decision
in accordance with the law-that is, a "legally fair" decision. The
duty of the appellate court is to reverse only those decisions that
are not in accordance with the law; thus, appellate decisions may
be the best measure of the success of lower courts in "correctly"
deciding cases.
Obviously, an erroneous jury verdict in a will contest proceed-
ing harms the party that should have won because that party does
not receive his or her rightful inheritance. A less obvious, but
nonetheless significant negative effect of an incorrect jury verdict
is its effect on testator interests. By incorrectly determining the
validity of the testator's will and thus distributing the property to
the wrong party, a jury in error effectively frustrates a testator's
wishes. 120 Further, the recurrence of erroneous jury verdicts nega-
tively affects the court system as a whole, as such verdicts cause
the public to lose confidence in the legitimacy of judicial process-
ing of testamentary disputes.
The two previously-mentioned studies of will contest proceed-
ings illustrate the "legal unfairness" of juries. In the California
study, 62 percent of the attacks on contestants' verdicts for insuffi-
ciency of the evidence resulted in reversal.1 2' In the Minnesota
study of testamentary undue influence cases, juries were reversed
approximately 60 percent of the time; in contrast, judges were re-
versed only about ten percent of the time.'2 2 Similarly, in the Min-
nesota study's focus on testamentary capacity cases, juries were re-
", See text accompanying notes 96-104.
,, See Bade, 22 Minn L Rev at 519 (cited in note 96).
C91 omment, 6 Stan L Rev at 92 n 4 (cited in note 95).
,2, See Bade, 22 Minn L Rev at 516-17.
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versed approximately 30 percent of the time, while judges were
reversed only about ten percent of the time. 12 Thus, jury verdicts
of will contest cases are more frequently reversed than judicial
decisions.
However, based on a general survey measuring the differences
between jury verdicts and bench decisions, Professor Kalven ar-
gued that judges and juries usually agree on the result of cases. 12
For eight thousand cases throughout the United States, the jury
verdict and a statement from the judge of how he or she would
have decided the case was obtained. 25 In 80 percent of criminal
cases and 79 percent of personal injury cases, the judges' state-
ments agreed with the juries' verdicts. 26
The relatively high rate of agreement between juries and
judges in criminal and personal injury cases, when compared to the
low rate of agreement in will contest Cases, indicates a fundamen-
tal difference between such cases and will contests. Unlike criminal
and personal injury cases, where the jury decides which of the two
parties present (prosecutor and defendant or plaintiff and defend-
ant) prevails, in will contest cases, the jury should decide not
which party (contestant or devisee) wins, but whether the instru-
ment presented is the true will of the testator. In practice, how-
ever, the jury often decides "not whether the instrument is the will
of the testator, but whether it is such a will as they think he ought
to have made.' 1 27 Juries tend to decide which party appears most
entitled to the property, not whether the instrument accurately
represents the will of the testator. Thus, juries substitute their own
sense of equity in place of the law's recognition that testators may
dispose of their property as they choose. 128
Advisory jury trials of will contests may arguably be more "le-
gally fair" than regular jury trials since they are formally tried to
the bench, and the judge can discard advisory verdicts not in ac-
cordance with the law. 29 In practice, however, most judges who
impanel advisory juries do not lightly discard their verdicts.'30 For
12 See id at 518-19,
'4 See Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1063-65 (cited in note 90).
125 Id.
120 Id.
"' Bade, 22 Minn L Rev at 519 (cited in note 96) (quoting Schmidt v Schmidt, 47
Minn 451, 50 NW 598, 600 (1891)).
120 See Herbert D. Laube, The Right of a Testator to Pauperize His Helpless Depen-
dents, 13 Cornell L Q 559, 572 (1928).
" See Note, 100 Harv L Rev at 1365 (cited in note 112).
130 Id.
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example, the North Dakota Supreme Court has noted that advi-
sory verdicts should be given "grave consideration. '" 131 If judges
give advisory juries equal deference to regular juries, then advisory
juries may be no more legally fair than regular juries.
Trials of will contests by juries that render special verdicts
may also appear more legally fair than regular jury trials, since in
regular jury trials there is no way of knowing whether the jury
made its decision based on the law or on prejudice or personal
favor.132 In trials where the jury renders a special verdict, the
judge's specific questions direct the jury's attention towards the le-
gal issues and away from prejudice and personal favor. 3
Despite the fact that the use of both advisory juries and juries
that render special verdicts arguably mitigates some of the "legal
unfairness" of juries in will contests, these juries are still less le-
gally fair than judges. Although judges retain more control in these
cases, they may still feel compelled to show deference to legally
unfair jury decisions. Therefore, no form of jury should be used in
will contest proceedings because juries are less likely to make le-
gally correct decisions.
3. Juries Have Inherent Limitations as Laymen.
Juries, because of their inherent limitations as laymen, have
difficulty dealing with the specific issues that arise in will con-
tests. 1 3 For example, one issue in the Mann case was the mental
capacity of the testator. Several competent witnesses testified that
the testator clearly knew she was signing a will.1 35 Nonetheless,
based on evidence that she failed to care properly for herself years
before she signed the will, the jury found that she lacked testamen-
tary capacity. '36
The inherent limitations of juries have created a perception
among some individuals that jury trials are a process where a
group of inexperienced laymen "are invited to apply law which
they will not understand to facts they will not get straight." On the
other hand, Professor Kalven argued that jury verdicts agree with
judicial decisions just as often in difficult cases as in easy ones. '
Id (quoting Sprenger v Sprenger, 146 NW2d 36, 39 (ND 1966)).
132 See Charles T. McCormick, Jury Verdicts Upon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2
FRD 176, 177 (1941).
,s' See id at 181.
See Comment, 6 Stan L Rev at 95 (cited in note 95).
13' See Estate of Mann, 184 Cal App 3d 593, 229 Cal Rptr 225, 228 (1986).
' See id at 231.
'37 See Kalven, 50 Va L Rev at 1066 (cited in note 90).
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Kalven suggested that although a single layman may not have a
judge's capacity to understand a difficult case, twelve laymen, by
using their "collective recall," may have as good or better capacity
to understand a difficult case than one judge."3 '
While Kalven's study may prove that juries understand the
facts and law in most types of cases, it is inapplicable to will con-
tests, because, as noted above, studies have shown that will contest
juries are reversed on appeal far more often than judges. Regard-
less of whether will contests are classified as easy or difficult cases,
the fact remains that juries are less able than judges to decide
them in accordance with the law. This is partially due to the diffi-
culties laymen have in understanding the legal definitions of key
issues such as testamentary capacity and undue influence. Conse-
quently, juries tend to decide will contests based solely on their
personal preference as to which party, the contestant or the devi-
see, is more deserving of the testator's property, rather than the
intent of the testator.
Advisory jury trials do not necessarily mitigate the damage re-
sulting from the limitations of laymen in dealing with will contest
issues. Although the judge can discard advisory verdicts that dis-
play a misunderstanding of the facts or the law,'39 judges who im-
panel advisory juries tend to give their verdicts deference. 40 Thus,
damage resulting from laymen dealing with testamentary issues
may be no less, even though an advisory jury is used rather than a
regular jury.
Likewise, juries that render special verdicts do not necessarily
lessen the damage resulting from the difficulties laymen have un-
derstanding the issues that arise in will contests. Special verdicts
reduce jury confusion in dealing with complex cases by giving ju-
ries precise instructions'" and focusing their attention on the is-
sues of the case.'42 However, even juries that render special ver-
dicts are often confused by complex cases. Juries rendering special
verdicts indicate their confusion by rendering responses inconsis-
tent with the specific questions asked.143 For example, in a Fifth
Circuit case, the jury answered one special question finding the
... See id at 1067.
139 See Note, 100 Harv L Rev at 1365 (cited in note 112).
140 Id.
141 See John R. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 FRD 338,
345-46 (1967).
"' See McCormick, 2 FRD at 181 (cited in note 132); Note, 53 Fordham L Rev at 1090-
91 (cited in note 116).
141 See Note, 53 Fordham L Rev at 1092.
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plaintiff's decedent was contributorily negligent, while answering
another by finding that zero percent of the total negligence was
attributable to him.'4
4
In sum, juries may be able to utilize their "collective recall" to
help them understand difficult cases, and advisory juries and juries
that render special verdicts may be used to mitigate the damage
resulting from the inherent limitations of laymen in dealing with
issues that arise in will contests. Nonetheless, judges, because of
their experience and legal education, understand will contest issues
better than laymen. Thus, no form of jury trial should be used in
will contest cases.
4. Juries Are Vulnerable to the "Emotional Overlays" that
Pervade Will Contests.
In a 1916 North Carolina case, the testator left the bulk of his
property to the First Christian Scientist Church, leaving his wife
and daughter practically destitute.145 One witness was permitted to
testify "that any man who would make such a will must be
crazy. 1 46 This testimony prodded the jury into finding that the
testator lacked testamentary capacity when he signed the will, and
that the will was therefore invalid.4 On appeal, the jury's verdict
was upheld despite the fact that the case was of a type in which
jurors are naturally prone to find against the validity of the will
because the plight of the contestant appeals to their sympathy. 4"
The jury's vulnerability to these "emotional overlays ' 4 may
be somewhat mitigated by states that use advisory juries or special
verdicts. A judge can discard advisory verdicts based on emotion
rather than on law.15 0 As previously noted, however, most judges
who impanel advisory juries give their verdicts deference,' 5' and
this deference gives litigants no more protection from verdicts
based on emotion in advisory jury trials than in regular jury trials.
Special verdicts may also be used to mitigate the vulnerability of
juries to the "emotional overlays" that pervade will contests. Spe-
cial verdicts focus the jury's attention towards the legal issues in
14 Id (citing Morrison v Frito-Lay, Inc., 546 F2d 154, 158-59 (5th Cir, 1977)).
"'. See In re Staub's Will, 172 NC 138, 90 SE 119, 121 (1916).
46 See id at 122 (Brown dissenting).
147 Id.
t48 Id.
149 See Comment, 6 Stan L Rev at 95 (cited in note 95).
"I See Note, 100 Harv L Rev at 1365 (cited in note 112).
151 Id.
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the case, 5 ' and away from these emotional overlays, but are still
inferior to the reasoned decisions of experienced judges.
Although the use of advisory juries or special verdicts may
mitigate the vulnerability of juries to "emotional overlays," all
forms of juries are more likely to become entangled in emotional
testamentary issues than seasoned judges. Judges repeatedly see
will contest cases, gaining experience that, combined with their le-
gal training, enables them to apply the law without becoming un7
duly entangled in "emotional overlays." Thus, in will contest cases,
bench trials are preferable to any form of jury trial.
B. Arguments for Using Jury Trials in Will Contests
Two arguments are typically offered in support of the use of
juries in will contests. First, juries are more "equitably fair" than
judges. Second, juries add legitimacy to the legal system by foster-
ing community participation in the resolution of legal disputes.
1. Juries Are More "Equitably Fair" Than Judges.
Some argue that juries, such as the North Carolina jury in the
above example, 53 may be acting properly when they decide will
contests based on their sense of equity, rather than based on the
law.'5 The jury is charged that a will is not to be set aside merely
because it appears to be unreasonable or unjust.'55 Unjust or un-
reasonable wills usually involve a question of testamentary capac-
ity,' 6 and juries usually decide this question based on an equitable
decision about who should receive the property of the testator
rather than based on the application of prevailing legal stan-
dards. 57 The equitable decisions of a jury, this argument runs,
may be better than a strict application of the law. As one commen-
tator noted, "the common sense instincts of the jury are likely to
lead them right in cases of this character.' 58 The large quantity of
litigation over capricious and arbitrary wills may be evidence that
the courts should not coldly apply the law that guarantees testa-
tors absolute dominion over their property. 59 Juries may be mak-
"s See McCormick, 2 FRD at 181 (cited in note 132); Note, 53 Fordham L Rev at 1090-
91 (cited in note 116).
... See text accompanying note 145.
"s See Laube, 13 Cornell L Q at 572 (cited in note 128).
See, for example, Estate of Mann, 184 Cal App 3d 593, 229 Cal Rptr 225, 234 (1986).
"o See Laube, 13 Cornell L Q at 573.
167 Id.
Id at 572.
Id at 574-75.
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ing truly just decisions, and consequently the appellate courts may
be wrong to reverse them. 6 '
However, the argument that juries should misapply the law to
reach the correct decision is severely flawed. If juries are acting
properly when they decide to set aside wills that are unreasonable
or unjust, it follows that the legislature should simply change the
law rather than have juries misapply it. For example, in North
Carolina there is now a statutory elective share given to surviving
spouses. 6' Thus, juries no longer need to misapply North Carolina
law to ensure that a surviving spouse is not left destitute.
When juries decide to set aside a will because it is unreasona-
ble or unjust, they are acting against the express written wishes of
the testator., Allowing juries to decide cases on an equitable basis
leads to arbitrary decisions, and this arbitrariness "may degenerate
into a system in which juries tend not merely to temper law with
equity in occasional cases of conflict, but to disregard the law gen-
erally and follow prejudice or personal favor."' 62
States that take a middle position on the use of jury trials in
will contests by using advisory juries retain some of the equitable
advantages of juries while checking jury verdicts when they degen-
erate into decisions based on personal favor or prejudice. Advisory
jury trials are formally tried before the judge, so the judge can dis-
card advisory jury verdicts based on personal favor or prejudice.'63
Since judges who impanel advisory juries often give their verdicts
deference, 6 4 if an advisory jury makes an equitably just decision in
a case, a judge may defer to the verdict.
Similarly, trials to juries that render only special verdicts al-
low some freedom for the jury to decide cases based on equitable
considerations while preventing the jury from making arbitrary de-
cisions. 165 Special verdicts do this by focusing the jury on the im-
portant issues of the case. 6 6 This ensures that the jury has not
merely considered which party they want to win. 6 7
Although one might argue that juries should inject equitable
considerations into will contests, the legislature should change the
law rather than having juries misapply it. The strict legal rules
160 Id.
161 See NC Gen Stat § 30-1 (1984).
'" McCormick, 2 FRD at 177 (cited in note 132).
16 See Note, 100 Harv L Rev at 1365 (cited in note 112).
164 Id.
"I See McCormick, 2 FRD at 177.
166 See id at 181; Note, 53 Fordham L Rev at 1090-91 (cited'in note 116).
167 See McCormick, 2 FRD at 178.
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governing testamentary capacity and undue influence are in place
to assure that the testator's property is distributed in accordance
with the testator's intent. Even slight flexibility of these strict legal
rules will defeat the legislature's goal: to ensure that the testator's
property is distributed as intended by the testator, regardless of
equitable considerations. Despite the fact that advisory juries and
special verdicts balance equitable considerations with legal consid-
erations to some extent, relaxing the strict legal rules governing
testamentary capacity and undue influence will defeat the purpose
of these rules, and have the practical effect of no standards at
all.'68 Thus, regardless of whatever value a jury's equitable consid-
erations have, in order to avoid a complete breakdown of the legal
standards of testamentary capacity and undue influence, we should
adopt a bright-line rule of not using any form of jury in will con-
test cases.
2. Jury Trials Add Legitimacy to the Legal System by Fos-
tering Community Participation in the Resolution of Legal
Disputes.
Some cases involve factual situations that may be susceptible
to a verdict favoring either party. '1 9 Decisions in such cases will
necessarily be arbitrary. The consensus verdict of a jury, based on
their common sense and experience, may be preferable to an arbi-
trary decision of a judge, based on his or her personal biases. 170
Juries are more representative of the community than judges, who
poorly reflect the broader community because of their consistently
narrow backgrounds."1 Due to their superior reflection of commu-
nity values, jury trials increase the legitimacy of the legal system.
Thus, this argument runs, juries should be used in all types of
cases, including will contest cases. However, juries tend to be un-
usually "legally unfair" when deciding will contests, and this "legal
unfairness" may cause the public to lose confidence in the legiti-
macy of the judicial processing of will contests.
Advisory jury trials, like regular jury trials, increase the legiti-
macy of the judicial processing of will contests by fostering com-
See Comment, 6 Stan L Rev at 101 (cited in note 95).
109 See Peter W. Culley, In Defense of Civil Juries, 35 Me L Rev 17, 28 (1983).
'~o See id at 28-29.
," "[Sitate trial judges draw an average salary of approximately $41,000, consist of
2.5% women and 3.8% blacks, and necessarily have extensive formal education due to bar
requirements." Note, 100 Harv L Rev at 1372 n 69 (cited in note 112) (citing Stephen Gil-
lers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U Pa L Rev 1, 63 n 300 (1980)).
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munity participation in the resolution of these legal disputes.172
Moreover, advisory jury trials decrease "legal unfairness" by al-
lowing a judge to discard the verdict." 3 Nonetheless, in practice,
advisory jury trials are not much more "legally fair" than regular
jury trials because judges who impanel advisory juries show their
verdicts great deference. "'
Special verdicts, too, increase confidence in the legitimacy, of
the judicial processing of will contests by fostering community par-
ticipation in the resolution of these legal disputes. In addition, spe-
cial verdicts provide litigants and the community with a better un-
derstanding of how juries analyze will contest cases than regular
verdicts. 175 Finally, special verdicts decrease "legal unfairness" rel-
ative to regular verdicts by focusing the jury on the important is-
sues of the case.1' Nonetheless, like advisory jury trials, trials by
juries that render special verdicts are only a moderate improve-
ment over regular jury trials.
Although advisory juries and special verdicts mitigate the
problem of "legal unfairness" while retaining community participa-
tion, these middle ground positions are not acceptable. A solution
that somewhat mitigates the problem of "legal unfairness" is insuf-
ficient when the problem can be nearly eliminated by a bright-line
rule abrogating the use of juries in will contests. The risk of "legal
unfairness" outweighs the advantage of community participation,
especially, since this "legal unfairness" may lead to a decrease in
public confidence in the legitimacy of judicial processing of will
contests. In will contest proceedings, the community should par-
ticipate in a manner other than acting as juries, such as participa-
tion in the legislative process. Since the community can still par-
ticipate in the legal system as jurors in other types of cases, a
bright-line rule of not using any form of jury to decide the small
subset of will contests will not hurt the overall legitimacy of the
legal system.
CONCLUSION
The current role of juries in American will contest cases is
largely a product of English history. In England, at the time the
,71 See Note, 100 Harv L Rev at 1376.
See id at 1365.
See id.
'T' Note, 53 Fordham L Rev at 1092 (cited in note 116).
171 See McCormick, 2 FRD at 181 (cited in note 132); Note, 53 Fordham L Rev at 1090-
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colonies were formed, wills of personalty were usually contested in
the ecclesiastical courts, which sat without a jury. Wills that con-
tained both realty and personalty were also contested in the eccle-
siastical courts, but a challenge to the devise of realty could only
be made by bringing an action of trespass or ejectment in the com-
mon law courts, which used a jury. Wills that contained only realty
could not be contested at all, unless an action of trespass or eject-
ment was brought at common law. In America, states have gener-
ally held that there is no constitutional or common law right to a
jury trial in will contest proceedings because wills were contested
in the ecclesiastical courts, which sat without a jury. However,
most states have created a statutory right to jury trial in will con-
test proceedings because wills of realty could only be contested in
front of a jury in England, and in America, wills of personalty and
realty are combined in one action.
American states generally take one of four approaches to the
use of juries in the resolution of will contests: (1) granting a right
to jury trials, (2) using advisory juries, (3) using juries that may
render only special verdicts, or (4) not using juries at all. The last
approach, the bright-line rule of no jury trials in will contests, al-
ready adopted by 13 states, should be adopted by all of the states.
This approach would save probate litigants and courts time and
money, result in more "legally fair" decisions, and eliminate the
problems arising from the inherent limitations of juries, as laymen,
in dealing with the issues that arise in will contests, and their vul-
nerability to emotional overlays. Although one might argue that ju-
ries should be used to inject "equitable fairness" into the resolu-
tion of will contests, the legislature should change laws that are
"equitably unfair" rather than having juries misapply them. More-
over, any relaxation of the strict standards of testamentary capac-
ity and undue influence will lead to a breakdown of these stan-
dards, and result in verdicts based on prejudice and personal favor.
Finally, although one might argue that the use of jury trials in will
contest proceedings adds legitimacy to the legal system by foster-
ing community participation in the resolution of legal disputes, the
community should participate in a manner other than acting as ju-
ries, such as participating in the legislative process. The "legal un-
fairness" inherent in all forms of jury trials in will contests relative
to bench trials and the needless extra delay outweighs the advan-
tages of community participation. The community can still partici-
pate in the legal system through criminal and personal injury
cases, where their verdicts are more consistently "legally fair."
Therefore, in order to decrease negative effects to testators, devi-
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sees, contestants, and the court system resulting from the many
problems with all forms of jury trials, the best policy for states is
to abrogate all jury trials in will contest proceedings.

